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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 This case requires us to determine whether a 
private company that operates service plazas on New 
Jersey highways acted “under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State,” 42 
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U.S.C. § 1983, when it removed brochures belonging to a 
“gentleman’s club” from the common areas of its service 
plazas.  We hold that it did not.  The absence of any 
direct involvement by the state authorities either in the 
decision to remove the brochures or in the general, day-
to-day operations of the service plazas compels this 
conclusion.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment.  
I. 
P.R.B.A. Corporation (t/a “Bare Exposure”) is a 
New Jersey corporation that operates a “gentleman’s 
club” in Atlantic City, New Jersey, billing itself as 
“Atlantic City’s Only All Nude Entertainment.”  HMS 
Host Toll Roads, also a private corporation, leases 
service plazas located along the Garden State Parkway 
and the Atlantic City Expressway from the South Jersey 
Transportation Authority and the New Jersey Turnpike 
Authority (together referred to as the “Authorities”).  
Host operates restaurants, gift shops, and convenience 
stores in the service plazas it leases from the Authorities.  
The leases also state that Host must pay the Authorities 
the higher of either a percentage of its gross sales or a 
fixed rental payment each month.  The parties agree, 
however, that the Authorities are not involved in any of 
Host’s day-to-day operations or overall management of 
the service plazas.  Under the leases, the Authorities’ 
only direct responsibility is to perform long-term 
 4 
 
maintenance to parking areas, exteriors of the buildings, 
and building lobbies. 
In 2003, Host entered into a contract with CTM 
Media Group, Inc. which permitted CTM to install and 
service CTM-owned brochure display racks in the 
lobbies of the service plazas.  CTM pays Host the greater 
of a minimum monthly payment or 40% of the gross 
revenue generated by the brochure racks.  The contract 
also provides that Host “must approve all brochures or 
publications of any kind” prior to placement in the racks.  
The Authorities were not a party to this contract.  
In 2012, Kevin Diamond, a Host employee, 
discovered a Bare Exposure brochure in one of the CTM 
display racks located in a Host service plaza.  Diamond 
sent a copy of the brochure to Greg Dion, Host’s General 
Manager of New Jersey Motorway Operations.  Dion 
contacted CTM and instructed its representative to 
remove all Bare Exposure brochures from Host’s service 
plazas.  The parties agree that Mr. Dion’s decision to 
have the brochures removed was his and his alone; he did 
not consult with or receive any direction from the 
Authorities.  Nor did he review or consider any 
provisions of the New Jersey Administrative Code prior 
to making his decision.  Instead, he believed that he was 
exercising Host’s right under the CTM Agreement to 
approve all brochures placed in the racks. 
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There is also no evidence that the Authorities ever 
directed Host employees to take any actions regarding 
the placement of brochures in the plazas.  Further, the 
leases between Host and the Authorities are silent with 
respect to the placement of brochures and other 
marketing materials in the lobbies of the service plazas.  
That said, Bare Exposure contends that the Authorities 
placed several government signs and photographs in 
service plaza lobbies.  These include photos of the 
current Governor of New Jersey, a photo of the late 
Senator Farley in the common area of one plaza, and a 
government information booth in the common area of 
another.  It is undisputed, however, that no representative 
of the Authorities ever instructed Host to remove a 
brochure or advertisement from the lobby of a service 
plaza along the Garden State Parkway or Atlantic City 
Expressway. 
II. 
After learning of the brochures’ removal, Bare 
Exposure filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that 
Host’s actions violated Bare Exposure’s First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  This case comes to us on 
a timely appeal from the District Court’s February 6, 
2015, order granting Host’s motion for summary 
judgment.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 to review the District Court’s ruling on Bare 
Exposure’s § 1983 claim.  Lassiter v. City of Phila., 716 
F.3d 53, 55 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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 It is well established that we employ a plenary 
standard in reviewing orders entered on motions for 
summary judgment, applying the same standard as the 
district court.  Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 
236 (3d Cir. 1995).  In considering an order entered on a 
motion for summary judgment, “we view the underlying 
facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”  Id. 
III. 
 While Bare Exposure’s appellate brief attempted to 
present two arguments as to why it believed this Court 
should find state action, at oral argument counsel 
clarified that Bare Exposure was actually limiting its 
appeal to a single argument.  Specifically, counsel argued 
only that Host is a state actor under the entwinement 
test.1  We confine our analysis accordingly.2   
                                                 
1 Indeed, had Bare Exposure not conceded this point, the 
Court would have similarly limited the scope of review 
because Bare Exposure explicitly confined itself to this 
argument when opposing Host’s motion for summary 
judgment in the District Court.  Pl.’s Br. in Opp. to S.J. at 
1.  See Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 
212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A litigant] must unequivocally 
put its position before the trial court at a point and in a 
manner that permits the court to consider its merits.”); 
Liberles v. Cook Cnty., 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 
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 We next turn to the merits of Bare Exposure’s state 
action argument.  The touchstone for our analysis of all 
state action claims is Brentwood v. Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).  In 
Brentwood, the Supreme Court held that “state action 
may be found if, though only if, there is such a close 
nexus between the State and the challenged action that 
seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that 
                                                                                                             
1983) (“It is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a 
summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of 
the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment 
should not be entered.  If it does not do so, and loses the 
motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.”).   
2 We also note that Bare Exposure’s initial attempt to rely 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), which has been 
credited with creating the symbiotic relationship test, is 
of no merit even if this argument were not waived.  As 
this Court clarified in Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t 
Inc., “while Burton remains good law, it was crafted for 
the unique set of facts presented, and we will not expand 
its reach beyond facts that replicate [it].”  289 F.3d 231, 
242-44, (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc).  This case does not 
present such facts.  Bare Exposure does not claim that 
Host’s removal of the brochures was necessary for the 
continued financial viability of either the Authorities or 
Host—one finding (among many others) necessary to 
replicate the factual scenario present in Burton. 
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of the State itself.”  Id. at 295; see also Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (“The ultimate issue in 
determining whether a person is subject to suit under 
§ 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under 
the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement 
of federal rights fairly attributable to the State?”) 
(emphasis added). 
 The Brentwood Court also gave additional 
structure to several tests that lower courts had previously 
been using to determine whether a private party satisfied 
the “close nexus” requirement necessary to be considered 
a state actor.  One of these tests is called the 
“entwinement test,” which asks whether “[t]he nominally 
private character of the Association is overborne by the 
pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public 
officials in its composition and workings, and [thus] there 
is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying 
constitutional standards to it.”  Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 
298.   
 The Supreme Court also applied this test in 
Brentwood when it held that a non-profit athletic 
association which regulated interscholastic sports among 
Tennessee public and private high schools was a state 
actor.  In so doing, the Court focused on the top-to-
bottom intermingling of association leaders and public 
school officials: “[t]here would be no recognizable 
Association, legal or tangible, without the public school 
officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly 
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perform all but the purely ministerial acts by which the 
Association exists and functions in practical terms.”  Id. 
at 300.  Indeed, “[o]nly the 16% minority of private 
school memberships prevents this entwinement of the 
Association and the public school system from being 
total and their identities totally indistinguishable.”  Id.  
This case thus shows that the entwinement test focuses 
on the overlap or merger of public and private entities as 
a result of their shared leadership or other attributes that 
make it hard to separate their public functions from their 
private ones. 
Two additional cases help further flesh out the 
contours of this test.  First, in Gannett Satellite 
Information Network, Inc. v. Berger, this Court 
concluded that the concessionaires that leased property in 
the Newark Airport and decided not to distribute certain 
newspapers were simply “private entities pursuing 
private ends” because there was no “explicit 
governmental involvement” in the decisions of the 
concessionaires and thus their conduct “may not fairly be 
attributed to the Port Authority.”  894 F.2d 61, 67 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  The Gannett Court also went on to note that, 
“[a]bsent any explicit governmental involvement in the 
distribution decisions of these private newsstands, the 
actions taken by the concessionaires in this case may not 
fairly be attributed to the Port Authority.”  Id. at 67 
(emphasis added).  Gannett thus makes clear that our 
analysis should also focus on evidence of explicit 
 10 
 
involvement of the governmental authority in the specific 
action the plaintiffs challenge.  In Gannett, it was the 
decision not to sell certain newspapers.  Here, it was the 
removal of Bare Exposure’s brochures. 
 Second, in Marie v. American Red Cross, the Sixth 
Circuit further elaborated on the high bar necessary for a 
finding of impermissible entwinement.  771 F.3d 344 
(6th Cir. 2014).  In this case, even the close working 
relationship between several state agencies and the Red 
Cross was not sufficient to constitute entwinement.  The 
Sixth Circuit reiterated that “mere cooperation simply 
does not rise to the level of merger required for a finding 
of state action.”  Id. at 364.  Instead, there must be 
“pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public 
officials in [the private entity’s] composition and 
workings [such that] there is no substantial reason to 
claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to 
it.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 All these cases show that we must carefully 
analyze the entire record to determine whether the 
Authorities were so pervasively entwined in the structure 
and management of Host that Host should fairly be 
treated as a government entity under the Constitution. 
 The record in this case does not suggest any 
pervasive entwinement.  There was no personnel overlap 
between the Authorities and Host, and no specific 
involvement of the Authorities in Host’s decision to 
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remove the brochures.  Bare Exposure’s strongest 
argument is the presence of a provision in the service 
plaza leases that requires Host, in certain situations, to 
pay a varying percentage of its gross sales income to the 
Authorities instead of a fixed amount.  There is no 
indication, however, that this profit sharing led to any 
actual involvement of either entity in the management or 
control of the other.  Thus, without more, this financial 
remuneration for the leasehold fails to provide any 
indication of the “pervasive entwinement” required under 
Brentwood. 
 We also hold that the presence of government 
signs and images of state officials in the service plazas—
without more—does not constitute entwinement.  Even 
assuming that the Authorities required Host to place 
these signs and images in the common areas, this fact still 
does not suggest actual entwinement, let alone “pervasive 
entwinement” as required by Brentwood.  Without any 
showing of the involvement of the Authorities in the 
operations of Host, this can at best be viewed as an 
additional requirement placed on Host as a condition of 
its continued leasing of the service plazas.  This type of 
detailed control or regulation, however, is not a form of 
entwinement.  See Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t Inc., 
289 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[T]he Court 
has repeatedly opined that regulation—even detailed 
regulation, as we have here—does not equate to state 
action.”).   
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 The same can be said of Bare Exposure’s 
allegation that the Authorities’ signs and photographs 
create the perception that the service plazas are run by 
the state.  Even assuming this to be true, the mere 
perception of governmental control is insufficient for 
finding state action under the entwinement test.  See S. F. 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U. S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522, 546 n.27 (1987) (noting that, “absent the additional 
element of governmental control,” the mere 
representation of the United States in the Olympics by 
the USOC is not sufficient for a finding of state action). 
IV.  
 For the reasons above, we conclude that the 
District Court appropriately granted summary judgment 
in favor of Host.  Accordingly, we will AFFIRM. 
